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基于国企高管的“政商”双重身份的视角,研究其在晋升和薪酬激励下的行为差异,指出晋升和薪酬的激励目标是不同的。研究发现:国企高管的晋升与业绩不相关,而与非经济指标相关;不同的晋升途径导致高管的行为不同,政治晋升与公司承担的社会责任和非效率投资正相关,非政治晋升与关联方占用正相关;在高管晋升前的任职期间即晋升激励较强时,薪酬与业绩正相关,而与非经济指标不相关;晋升激励非经济目标,而薪酬只激励业绩。
Based on the dual perspectives of state-owned executives and their double identities, this paper investigates the differences in behavior between promotion and remuneration incentive, and points out that the incentive goals of promotion and remuneration are different. The findings are as follows: The promotion of state-owned executives is not related to the performance but not to the economic indicators; the different promotion ways lead to the different behaviors of senior executives; the political promotion is positively related to the social responsibility and inefficient investment undertaken by the company; Correlation occupies a positive correlation. During the pre-executive promotion period, promotion incentives are strong, remuneration is related to performance, but not non-economic indicators. Ascendence promotes non-economic goals, and remuneration only encourages performance.