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本文在详细阐述食品质量安全政府监管部门职能划分基础上,运用博弈论的研究方法构建了地方监管部门与不同规模食品企业之间关于食品质量安全诚信监管的博弈模型,博弈分析说明了小规模食品企业失信经营现象严重且地方监管部门对其放松监管的深层原因,阐释了在地方政府影响下地方监管部门与大规模食品企业的博弈机理。结合博弈分析结果得出了促使不同规模食品企业诚信经营的对策建议。
This paper elaborates on the division of functions of government supervisory departments for food quality and safety, and uses a game theory approach to construct a game model for integrity supervision of food quality and safety among local regulatory agencies and food enterprises of different scales. Game analysis shows that small-scale foods The deep-seated reasons for serious business failures and local regulatory authorities’ deregulation have explained the game mechanism of local regulatory agencies and large-scale food companies under the influence of local governments. Based on the results of game analysis, the paper proposes the countermeasures to promote the integrity management of food enterprises of different scales.