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以政府主导的旧城改造运动频频上演,背后的利益冲突日益突出。分析其原因发现,在微观层面上,是因为组织设计中的激励机制如晋升机制、考核机制、上下级之间的信息不对称等诱发了政府官员有着追求政绩工程的强烈动机;在宏观层面上,是因为组织制度对城市基层政府的旧城改造行为缺乏有效约束,来自社会的力量未对基层政府的行为产生有效的影响。微观和宏观层面的双重原因,致使城市政府热衷于旧城改造,并且在不同的地区、不同的城市反复出现。
With the government-led transformation of the old city frequently staged, the conflicts of interest have become increasingly prominent. Analysis of the reasons for this shows that at the micro level, incentive mechanisms such as promotion mechanism, assessment mechanism and information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates in the organizational design induce the government officials to have strong motivation to pursue the performance engineering; at the macro level Because the organizational system lacks effective restraint on the urban reconstruction of urban grassroots governments and the power from the society does not have an effective impact on the behavior of grassroots governments. The dual causes at the micro and macro level have caused the urban government to be keen on the transformation of the old city and have repeatedly appeared in different regions and in different cities.