在不完全竞争框架下,分析了证券市场均衡价格形成过程,在拉丰-马斯金模型的基础上,建立了一个拥有私人信息的机构投资者与众多散户间的两时期交易模型,并分别讨论了不同均衡下机构投资者持有不同信息时,机构投资者和散户偏爱的均衡类型。结果显示,机构投资者偏爱混同均衡是有条件的,并且找到了条件的具体边界范围。最后讨论了不同均衡定价下的交易双方效用问题。 Under the framework of incomplete competition, this paper analyzes the formation process of the equilibrium price in the securities market. Based on the LaFon-Maskin model, this paper establishes a two-period transaction model between institutional investors with private information and numerous retail investors Discusses the types of equilibrium favored by institutional investors and retail investors when institutional investors hold different information under different equilibriums. The results show that institutional investors prefer the equilibrium with mixed conditions, and find the specific boundaries of the conditions. Finally, we discuss the utility of both parties under different equilibrium pricing.