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2007年,证券交易委员会(SEC)经过认真考虑最终否决一项要求公司选票上记载股东提名的董事候选人的规则。本文试图弄清这一否决的影响。一方面,SEC的否决对股东权利运动似乎是一个沉重打击。这是因为,许多股东权利倡导者长期以来将利用公司选票视为强化股东权利运动的“圣杯”。这些倡导者相信,利用公司选票对确保股东合法参与公司选举程序并影响公司事务至关重要。另一方面,一些公司专家主张,SEC的否决不应视为一个重大挫折。这些专家坚持认为,将利用公司委托书参与董事提名制度视为股东影响的必要条件没有认识到最近发展的重要性,例如绝对多数决制度的成功以及电子委托书规则的通过。因为这些发展为股东提供了影响公司事务的替代方法,有些人甚至认为这些发展可以使利用公司委托书参与董事提名变得无关紧要。确实,在认真研究这些发展的影响以及批判地探讨利用公司委托书参与董事提名对股东努力提高对公司治理的影响后,本文做出推断,虽然其他手段可能会有用,但是他们在强化股东权利方面不可能比利用公司委托书参与董事提名更有效。在此方面,未来的股东民主运动必须继续致力于利用公司委托书参与董事提名这一历史性战役。
In 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), after careful consideration, finally rejected a rule requiring directors of directors nominated by the shareholders to be recorded on the company’s ballot papers. This article attempts to clarify the impact of this veto. On the one hand, the SEC’s rejection of the shareholder rights movement seems to be a heavy blow. This is because many advocates for shareholder rights have long regarded the use of company votes as a “Holy Grail” to reinforce shareholder rights movements. These advocates believe that the use of company ballots is crucial to ensure that shareholders are legally involved in the company’s election process and affect the company’s affairs. On the other hand, some corporate experts argue that the SEC’s veto should not be seen as a major setback. These experts insisted that the use of a power of attorney for participation in the system of director nominations as a necessary condition for shareholder influence failed to recognize the importance of recent developments such as the success of the absolute majority rule and the adoption of the rules of electronic proxy. Because these developments provide shareholders with alternative ways of influencing corporate affairs, some may even argue that these developments make it irrelevant to use company counsel for nomination of directors. Indeed, after earnestly studying the impact of these developments and critically examining the use of company power of attorney to participate in the nomination of directors to make shareholder efforts to improve corporate governance, the article concludes that while other tools may prove useful, they are not alone in strengthening shareholder rights It can not be more effective than participating in a director’s nomination with a company proxy. In this regard, the future shareholder democracy movement must remain committed to using the company proxy to participate in the nomination of directors for this historic battle.