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本文从博弈论的角度证明了股票期权的真正激励效果主要在于其降低员工的离职率(第二种激励效应),而在激励员工更加努力工作方面的效果很小,且员工努力的效果是增加公司价值,还是降低公司的价值还很不明确。而大量关于股票期权的文章都在强调激励的第一种效果,几乎完全忽视真正有意义的股票期权的第二种激励效应;这些观点误导了目前许多推行股票期权激励制度的企业的实践。文章将要证明希望用股票期权来激励公司的大量关键管理人员和关键技术员工(即把激励的员工面尽量扩大)是不可能的、是矛盾的。笔者想以此来引起有关人员的注意,对股票期权的激励效果要有正确的认识,并用科学的理论指导实践。
This paper proves from the perspective of game theory that the real incentive effect of stock options is that it reduces the employee turnover rate (the second incentive effect), while the effect of motivating employees to work harder is small and the effect of employee efforts is to increase Corporate value, or reduce the value of the company is still not clear. However, a large number of articles on stock options emphasize the first effect of incentive, almost completely neglecting the second incentive effect of truly meaningful stock options. These views mislead the current practice of many enterprises that implement the stock option incentive system. The article is going to prove that it is impossible and contradictory to prove that a large number of key management personnel and key technical staff (that is, encouraging employees to be encouraged as much as possible) who want to use their stock options to incentivize the company are contradictory. In order to arouse the attention of the staff concerned, I want to have the correct understanding of the incentive effect of stock options, and use scientific theories to guide practice.