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地区资源禀赋的差异化导致地方官员面临不同的激励和约束。文章考察了有效竞争条件下的地方财政行为,着重分析了转移支付对异质性地方政府支出结构的影响。理论分析表明,资源禀赋不同的地区会有不同的财政支出偏向:资源丰裕地区的生产性支出所带来的GDP增量相对更高,当地官员为了谋求政治晋升,倾向于扩大政府生产性支出;资源匮乏的地区则倾向于扩大政府行政开支和福利性支出,前者可以增加地方官员的腐败和公务性消费,并通过构筑本地政治网络资源的方式提高私人效用,后者可以使地方官员赢得更多本地居民的支持。本文基于中国县级数据为上述逻辑判断提供了佐证。文章结论丰富了地方政府支出偏向的研究,为进一步规范政府支出结构提供了参考。
Differentiation of regional resource endowments has led local officials to face different incentives and constraints. The article examines the local financial behavior under the condition of effective competition, and emphatically analyzes the influence of transfer payment on the heterogeneous local government expenditure structure. Theoretical analysis shows that there are different fiscal expenditures in different regions with different resource endowments: the increment of GDP brought by productive expenditures in the resource-rich regions is relatively higher, and the local officials tend to expand the government productive expenditures in order to seek political promotion; Whereas resource-poor regions tend to increase government administration expenditures and welfare expenditures, the former can increase the corruption and official spending of local officials and increase private utility by building local political network resources, which can make local officials win more Local residents support. This article provides evidence of the above logic based on China’s county-level data. The conclusion of the article enriches the research on the bias of local government and provides reference for further regulating the structure of government expenditure.