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在考虑产品回收再制造的闭环供应链中,原始制造商如何应对外部再制造商的竞争威胁是其面临的重要决策问题。针对由制造商和再制造商组成的两周期闭环供应链系统,在两种竞争模式(具有专利授权机制的竞争模式以及无专利授权机制的竞争模式)以及合作模式下探讨了制造商和再制造商的最优博弈策略。运用逆向归纳法推导和比较三种决策模式下的产品价格,给出再制造商从事回收再制造的临界条件,结合数值算例分析消费者偏好对均衡解及渠道成员利润的影响。研究表明:(1)从环境绩效的角度分析,无专利授权竞争模式下的回收率最高,其次是合作模式,最低是具有专利授权的竞争模式,三种模式下的旧产品回收率均随消费者偏好的增加而增加;(2)从渠道效率的角度分析,合作模式下的闭环供应链系统总利润最高,其次是具有专利授权的竞争模式,最低的是无专利授权竞争模式。无专利授权竞争模式下的渠道总利润随消费者偏好的增加而减少,其他两种模式下的渠道总利润随消费者偏好的增加而增加;(3)从原始制造商的角度分析,当其可利用再制造专利授权机制保障自身利益时,并无动机与再制造商进行合作;相反,当制造商不具备专利授权保障时,其愿意与再制造商合作,但再制造商利润又将比合作前受损,因此需提供合理的契约机制确保合作模式的有效实施。本文研究结论可为现实中制造商合理选择与再制造商的竞争与合作策略提供理论支持。
In a closed-loop supply chain that considers product remanufacturing and remanufacturing, how the original manufacturer responds to the competitive threat of external remanufacturers is an important decision-making issue. For two-cycle closed-loop supply chain systems consisting of manufacturers and remanufacturers, manufacturers and remanufacturing were explored in two competing modes (competition mode with patent authorization mechanism and competition mode without patent authorization mechanism) and cooperation mode. The best game strategy for business. Using the inverse induction method to deduct and compare the product prices under the three decision models, and provide the critical conditions for the remanufacturers to engage in recycling and remanufacturing. The numerical examples are used to analyze the influence of consumer preferences on the equilibrium solutions and channel member profits. The research shows: (1) From the perspective of environmental performance, the recovery rate under the non-patented licensing competition model is the highest, followed by the cooperation model, and the lowest is the competition model with patent authorization. The old product recovery rates under the three models are all related to consumption. (2) From the perspective of channel efficiency, the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain system under the cooperation model is the highest, followed by the competition model with patent authorization, and the lowest is the competition model without patent authorization. The total channel profit under non-patent licensing competition mode decreases with the increase of consumer preference, and the total channel profit under the other two modes increases with the increase of consumer preference; (3) from the perspective of the original manufacturer, when There is no incentive to cooperate with remanufacturers when using the remanufacturing patent authorization mechanism to protect their own interests; on the contrary, when manufacturers do not have patent authorization protection, they are willing to cooperate with remanufacturers, but the profits of remanufacturers will be higher than those of remanufacturers. Before the cooperation is damaged, it is necessary to provide a reasonable contract mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of the cooperation model. The conclusion of this study can provide theoretical support for the manufacturer’s reasonable choice and re-manufacturers’ competition and cooperation strategy in reality.