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Midori是ASIACRYPT 2015上提出的一种轻量级分组密码算法,密钥长度为128-bit,分组长度为64/128-bit,分别对应Midori64和Midori128,可被用于保护物联网设备安全.对Midori算法抗故障分析安全性进行了评估.首先,基于信息论通过分析故障传播路径,对故障注入后的Midori密钥剩余熵进行了理论估计.结果表明:基于第R–3轮半字节和字节模型,1次故障注入可分别将Midori64、Midori128密钥剩余熵大约降低到68.47-bit、8.03-bit,但对倒数第2轮、第3轮故障分析复杂度较高,多次故障注入分析可解决该问题.然后,利用差分故障分析方法,对故障注入后的Midori密钥剩余熵进行了实际验证.结果表明:3次随机半字节、2次随机字节故障可分别将Midori64、Midori128的密钥剩余熵降低至8.10-bit和0-bit.最后,利用Midori代数方程简单特点,将代数分析引入到故障分析中,利用代数故障分析方法优化了Midori差分故障分析结果.结果表明:代数故障分析可将Midori64故障攻击扩展到复杂故障模型,基于第R–3轮字节故障模型、R–4轮半字节故障模型,可分别使用4次、10次故障注入恢复Midori64完整密钥;代数故障分析可以降低Midori128攻击复杂度,基于第R–3轮字节故障模型,1次故障注入在94%的情况下可将Midori128密钥熵降低至16-bit以内.因此,必须对Midori算法倒数5轮进行故障攻击防护.
Midori is a lightweight block cipher algorithm proposed by ASIACRYPT 2015 with key length of 128-bit and packet length of 64/128-bit, corresponding to Midori64 and Midori128, respectively, which can be used to secure IoT devices. Midori algorithm is used to evaluate the safety of anti-fault analysis.Firstly, based on information theory, the residual entropy of Midori key after fault injection is theoretically estimated by analyzing the fault propagation path.The results show that based on the R-3 round nibble and word Section model, a fault injection can reduce the residual entropy of the Midori64 and Midori128 keys to about 68.47-bit and 8.03-bit, respectively. However, for the last-second and third-round fault analysis, the complexity of the fault analysis is high and multiple fault injection analysis Which can solve the problem.Then, the residual entropy of the Midori key after the injection of the fault is verified by using the method of differential fault analysis.The results show that three times of random nibbles and two random bytes can respectively separate Midori64, Midori128 The residual entropy of the key is reduced to 8.10-bit and 0-bit.Finally, algebraic analysis is introduced into the fault analysis by using the simple features of the Midori algebraic equation, and the algebraic failure analysis method is used to optimize the Midori differential fault analysis The results show that algebraic failure analysis can extend Midori64 fault attacks to complex fault models. Based on the R-3 byte error model and the R-4 round nibble fault model, the fault can be injected 4 times and 10 times respectively Recover the Midori64 complete key. Algebraic failure analysis can reduce Midori128 attack complexity. Based on the R-3 round-robin fault model, one fault injection can reduce Midori128 key entropy to 16-bit in 94% of cases. Therefore, Midori algorithm must be the last 5 rounds of fault attack protection.