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在《逻辑哲学论》的结尾部分,维特根斯坦宣称他写的所有命题都是无意义的,必须将之抛弃掉。既然是无意义的东西,为什么要还要费心书写?如何来理解维特根斯坦的这一悖论式言说,一直是学界悬而未决的难题。以戴尔蒙与科南特为代表的新维特根斯坦派以有别于以往的对“无意义”的诠释为突破口,重新面对《逻辑哲学论》中的言说悖论,为之提供了一种新的消解方式,开启了维特根斯坦哲学研究的新面向。文章将以科南特的思想为这种新路径的考察对象,阐释其理论要旨以及揭示其面临的理论困境。
At the end of the “logical philosophy,” Wittgenstein declares that all the propositions he wrote are meaningless and must be discarded. Since it is a meaningless thing, why bother to write? How to understand Wittgenstein’s paradoxical language has always been an outstanding problem for the academic community. The new Wittgenstein, represented by Delmon and Konant, takes a different interpretation of “meaninglessness ” as a breakthrough and regains the paradox of speech in “Logic of Philosophy” to provide it with A new approach to digestion opened up a new direction to Wittgenstein’s philosophical research. The article will focus on this new path with Conant’s thought, explain its theoretical essence and reveal its theoretical difficulties.