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为研究供应链成员的风险态度对供应链中断风险的影响,采用演化博弈理论方法,建立了供应商与零售商行为交互的演化博弈模型,研究了决策参数的变化对演化结果的影响,并用数值仿真展示了决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响。研究发现,供应商和零售商风险态度的路径演化系统收敛于两种模式,既可以向良好状态演化,也可以向不良状态演化,并形成“锁定”;通过调节参数,系统可以跳出不良“锁定”状态。
In order to study the impact of supply chain risk attitude on supply chain interruption risk, an evolutionary game theory model is used to establish the evolutionary game model of supplier-retailer behavior interaction. The influence of the change of decision parameters on the evolutionary result is studied. The simulation shows the influence of different values of decision parameters and the change of initial conditions on the evolutionary result. The study finds that the path evolution system of risk attitude of suppliers and retailers converges to two modes, which can evolve from good state to bad state and form “lock”. By adjusting parameters, the system can jump out of bad “Locked ” state.