由于目前特殊的市场条件及政府特意的制度安排 ,导致了中国国有商业银行存在着大量的效率损失 ,而同时各利益相关方又处于一种利益均衡状态。从而使改革陷入一种胶着状态。低效率的根源在于国家借银行信用实现对改革成本的时期转换和挂帐递延 ,而维持这一低效率均衡状态的现实机制是存款的持续高速增长。但外资银行的进入打破了这一基础 ,外部新变量的引入打破了原有的均衡 ,由此自然引发国有商业银行一系列的适应性调整 ,市场改革引致产权改革 ,产权改革又进一步促进市场调整。在这一调整过程中 ,绕过目前改革困境的一种可行的选择是“以国债换坏帐” ,实现不良资产公共债务的本质复归 Due to the special market conditions and the government-specific institutional arrangements, there are a lot of efficiency losses in China’s state-owned commercial banks, meanwhile, all the stakeholders are in a balanced state of interests. So that the reform into a stalemate. The root cause of inefficiency lies in that the state realizes the conversion of the cost of reform through the bank credit and the deferred payment, while the realistic mechanism for maintaining this inefficient equilibrium is the sustained and rapid growth of deposits. However, the entry of foreign banks has broken this foundation. The introduction of new external variables has broken the original balance, which naturally leads to a series of adaptive adjustment of state-owned commercial banks. Property market reform leads to the reform of property rights. Property rights reform further promotes market adjustment . In this process of adjustment, a viable option for circumventing the current reform plight is to “replace bad debts with government bonds” so as to realize the essential return of the public debt of distressed assets