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本文以我国2000至2005年期间A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨在政府控制的特殊经济环境下,股权安排对会计盈余质量的影响,试图从会计契约角度对公司治理有效性做出新的诠析。本研究发现,控股股东对盈余质量的影响是非线性的,而第二大股东则对控股股东的壕沟防御效应起到有效的遏制作用。研究还发现,在政府行政干预力度加大和内部人利益侵害行为加剧的双重推动下,国有上市公司财务报告质量将进一步被降低。
This paper takes A-share listed companies in China from 2000 to 2005 as the research object, explores the influence of the equity arrangement on the accounting earnings under the special economic environment controlled by the government, attempts to make a new interpretation on the validity of corporate governance from the perspective of the accounting contract Analysis. This study finds that the controlling shareholder’s influence on earnings quality is nonlinear, while the second largest shareholder effectively controls the controlling shareholder’s moat defense effect. The study also found that the quality of state-owned listed companies’ financial reports will be further reduced under the dual promotion of intensified government administrative intervention and the violation of internal interests.