本文以沪深A股上市公司为样本,从债权人评价角度考察公司税收规避对银行契约制定的影响,并结合信息披露透明度及差异化的税收监管环境对避税债务契约效果问题进行了剖析。研究结果表明,债权银行对公司避税行为整体上予以负面评价,通过索取更高贷款利率及缩短贷款期限的方式将其纳入契约定价之中;良好的信息透明度有助于降低银行评估的避税代理风险,故在一定程度上缓解了税收规避对信贷配给产生的不利影响;在税收征管力度强的地区,信息透明度对税收规避与银行贷款契约之间关系的调节作用表现得不够突出,而随着地方税收监管的弱化,其调节作用更加显著,说明在抑制避税过程中管理者机会行为方面,税收征管与以信息透明度为代表的内部治理机制具有替代性效应。研究结论对认识转轨经济背景下公司避税经济后果提供了新的证据,也对健全我国现阶段公司综合治理体系具有一定的政策启示。 This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, examines the impact of corporate tax avoidance on the bank contract from the perspective of creditor evaluation, and analyzes the effect of tax avoidance debt contract with the transparency of information disclosure and the differentiated tax regulatory environment. The result shows that the creditor bank negatively appraises the tax avoidance behavior of the company as a whole and puts it into contract pricing by requesting higher loan interest rate and shortening the term of the loan. Good information transparency helps to reduce the tax risk of the tax agency , So to a certain extent, mitigated the adverse effects of tax evasion on credit rationing. In areas where tax administration was strong, the role of information transparency in regulating the relationship between tax evasion and bank lending contracts was not prominent enough. However, The weakening of tax regulation has a more significant regulatory role, which shows that tax collection and administration have an alternative effect on the internal governance mechanism represented by transparency in the suppression of opportunistic behavior of tax managers. The conclusions of the study provide new evidence for understanding the consequences of corporate tax avoidance in the context of the transitional economy, and also have some policy implications for the improvement of the comprehensive corporate governance system in China at the present stage.