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企业集群共性技术合作创新成功后,群内企业的行动选择有两种:遵守合作契约或采取道德风险行动。本文通过单阶段与多阶段无限博弈分析,得出了企业集群上下游企业纵向共性技术合作创新与竞争企业横向共性技术合作创新后道德风险行动的战略均衡。然后,对此两种不同类型的共性技术合作创新后的道德风险防范,本文通过委托代理理论建立了各自的最优惩罚契约模型,并从无惩罚契约和惩罚契约完备两种类型的企业集群共性技术合作创新为集群代理机构提供了相关管理建议。
After the success of technological cooperation and innovation, there are two kinds of actions for the enterprises in the group: to comply with the cooperation contract or to take the moral risk action. Through the analysis of single-stage and multi-stage infinite game, this paper draws a strategic equilibrium of the vertical common technical cooperation and innovation of enterprise upstream and downstream enterprises and the moral risk action after the horizontal common technical cooperation innovation. Then, after the cooperation of these two different types of common technologies to prevent moral hazard, this paper establishes the optimal model of the penalty contract through the principal-agent theory. From the two aspects of non-punitive contract and punitive contract, Technical cooperation and innovation for the cluster agency provides management advice.