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本文认为,我国国有企业的委托代理使得国有企业的权责利不明确,并滋生出各种寻租方式,使国有企业成为寻租网络。国有企业的寻租网络性质对投资效率产生了不利影响,企业分部的生产效率越低,分部经理的寻租能力越强,其寻租的可能性就越大,企业阻断寻租的代价就越高,对资源配置的不利影响也就越大。如果企业高层向下寻租,投资效率也将受到严重影响,影响以投资决策规则许可的范围为限。当政府向企业寻租或分部经理与政府官员合谋寻租时,企业的投资决策机制将被扭曲,企业投资效率可能极其低下。
This paper argues that the entrustment and agency of state-owned enterprises in China make the rights and responsibilities of state-owned enterprises unclear and breed various ways of rent-seeking so as to make state-owned enterprises become rent-seeking networks. The nature of the rent-seeking network of state-owned enterprises has an adverse impact on the efficiency of investment. The lower the production efficiency of the branch, the stronger the rent-seeking ability of branch managers, and the greater the possibility of rent-seeking. The higher the price, the greater the adverse impact on resource allocation. If the top executives rent-seeking, investment efficiency will also be seriously affected, the impact of investment decision-making rules to the extent permitted. When the government rent-to-business or branch managers and government officials seeking rent, the investment decision-making mechanism of enterprises will be distorted, the efficiency of business investment may be extremely low.