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为分析电力市场下流域梯级水电站的联盟策略,结合梯级水电站自身特点与发电约束,剖析流域上不同投资主体水电站的潜在联盟结构,建立联盟博弈模型,并采用改进的灰色GM(1,1)模型预测市场中对手的报价,以解决博弈的不完全信息问题。以某梯级水电站为例,探讨了梯级水电站不同联盟结构的形成条件。结果表明,市场需求弹性系数越高,梯级水电站的结盟偏好越显著。
In order to analyze the alliance strategy of cascaded hydropower stations in power market, combined with the characteristics of cascaded hydropower stations and power generation constraints, the potential coalition structure of hydropower stations with different investment entities in the basin is analyzed and a coalition game model is established. The improved gray GM (1,1) model Predict the market price of the opponent in order to solve the problem of incomplete game information. Taking a cascade hydropower station as an example, the formation conditions of different coalition structures of cascaded hydropower stations are discussed. The results show that the higher the market elasticity of demand, the more significant the alliance preference of cascade hydropower stations.