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针对证券市场普遍存在的学者背景独立董事,本文利用上市公司(2004—2012年)数据,研究发现董事会中学者背景独立董事比例越高时,公司财务业绩越好,CEO变更——业绩敏感性越高。特别地,当公司经历业绩滑坡后,将聘任更高比例的学者独董。进一步细化分析发现,综合型学者独董在提高业绩、提升CEO变更——业绩敏感性中作用更为明显,业绩滑坡后公司董事会更倾向于聘任综合型、专家型学者独董。总体而言,研究结果证实了学者独董的治理功能。
Based on the data of listed companies (2004-2012), this study finds that the higher the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors with higher background, the better the company’s financial performance, the higher the change of CEO - the more performance-sensitive high. In particular, when the company experiences a decline in performance, a higher percentage of academics will be hired as independent directors. Further refinement and analysis found that independent directors of integrated scholar played a more significant role in improving performance and improving CEO performance-performance sensitivity. After the performance decline, the board of directors preferred the appointment of independent and expert independent scholar. Overall, the findings confirm the governance function of scholar’s independent director.