论文部分内容阅读
我国农村低保政策的运行主要体现为基层政府的政策执行活动。通过对河北省北县、南县和宁县的调查发现,该政策的执行过程存在着明显的阶段性:初期的过度放宽与后期的过度收紧。这种阶段性的变动反映了基层政府在农村低保政策执行中的“过度化执行”逻辑,即人为放大上级政府所设定的行政目标,上级要求“应保尽保”则过度放宽办理条件,上级要求适度收紧则过度收缩甚至完全终止办理。这一执行逻辑的出现源于我国政府强力性、多层级的人事与财政控制、虚弱性的行政过程监督造成的基层政府“重结果而轻过程”的行为特征,以及自上而下的政绩考核与晋升竞争机制,使得基层政府形成对上级设定的政策目标层层加码以确保足额超额完成任务、凸显政绩的行政“冲动”。
The operation of China’s rural minimum living security policy is mainly embodied in the policy implementation activities of the grass-roots government. According to the investigation in Beixian County, Nanxian County and Ningxian County in Hebei Province, there are obvious stages in the implementation of this policy: over-relaxation in the initial stage and over-tightening in the latter stage. This phased change reflects the logic of “over-implementation” in the implementation of rural minimum security policies by grassroots governments, that is, the administrative goal set by the government at higher levels to be magnified by the higher authorities, and the higher authorities require that “ Excessive relaxation of handling conditions, the superior requirements of moderate tightening is over-contraction or even complete termination. This logic of enforcement stems from the grass-root government ’s ”heavy result but light process “ behavioral characteristics caused by the weak and multi-level personnel and financial control of the government in our country, and the top-down Performance evaluation and promotion of competition mechanism, making the formation of the grass-roots level policy targets set by superiors overweight to ensure that the full amount of overspending to complete the task, highlighting the administrative ”impulse."