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中国经济发展的奇迹在于理顺了中央政府、地方官员以及企业三者之间的关系。本文在稳定子博弈完美均衡的委托代理框架下,抓住政治集权、经济分权的特征,考察了中央与地方官员之间的博弈行动,将地方官员发展经济的行为模型化。地方经济发展本身面临不确定性,其发展绩效较大程度上取决于地方官员的努力程度,发展收益在政府和企业间的分配取决于地方官员的清廉程度,而地方官员的努力程度和清廉程度均取决于中央提供委托代理合约的具体特征。研究发现,中央能够对地方官员设置合理的政治激励与经济报酬激励,以获得高政治支持,进而促进地方经济发展与经济收益的合理分配,增进经济增长与和谐共融。
The miracle of China’s economic development lies in rationalizing the relations among the central government, local officials and enterprises. Under the framework of the perfect balanced sub-game of principal-agent game, this dissertation takes the characteristics of political centralization and economic decentralization, examines the game action between central and local officials, and models the behavior of local officials in their economic development. Local economic development is faced with uncertainty. Its development performance depends to a large extent on the efforts of local officials. The distribution of development benefits between the government and enterprises depends on the cleanliness of local officials. The efforts of local officials and the degree of cleanliness All depend on the specific characteristics of the entrusted agency contract provided by the Central Government. The study found that the Central Government can set reasonable political and economic remuneration incentives for local officials to obtain high political support so as to promote the rational distribution of local economic development and economic returns and promote economic growth and harmonious communion.