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企业所有权视角的研究认为,控股股东代理问题的产生原因是控股股东对控制权私人收益的追求,产生条件是控制权与现金流权的偏离。文章从现代企业制度视角分析控股股东代理问题的产生机制,认为现代企业制度为控股股东基于自利目的的侵占行为提供了可能和行为能力,为控股股东利益侵占的后果承担提供了免责机制,使控股股东代理问题的产生具备了一定的制度基础。
The research from the perspective of the ownership of the enterprise holds that the controlling shareholder’s proxy problem arises from the controlling shareholders’ pursuit of the private benefits of control. The condition arises from the deviation of control rights and cash flow rights. From the perspective of modern enterprise system, the article analyzes the generation mechanism of the controlling shareholder’s agency problem. It holds that the modern enterprise system provides the controlling shareholder with the possibility and ability to act in the embezzlement based on the purpose of self-interest and provides the exemption mechanism for the consequences of the controlling shareholders’ encroachment. The issue of controlling shareholder’s agency possesses a certain institutional foundation.