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刘易斯的因果性反事实条件分析是新休谟主义进路的典型代表,它试图通过引入“反事实条件”的模态范畴来弥补传统律则性理论的不足。然而,这一分析进路又产生了诸如可能世界的相似性、反事实条件依赖的时间箭头等新问题;本奈特、豪斯曼和霍维奇等人揭示了刘易斯的理论在这些问题上的根本困难。而这些困难的最终解决依赖于彻底抛弃休谟主义的因果性研究进路,转向因果实在论和实验的、操作的因果观念。
Lewis’s causal and factual analysis of conditions is a typical representative of the new Hume’s approach. It attempts to make up for the deficiencies of the traditional theory of law by introducing the modal category of “counterfactual conditions.” However, this approach has led to new problems such as the similarity of possible worlds and the time-lapse of counter-factual conditions; Bennett, Hausman and Khovic reveal the foundations of Lewis’s theory on these issues difficult. The final solution to these difficulties relies on the total abandonment of Hume’s causal approach to causation and experimental and operational causal concepts.