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本文主要验证在我国现行报告制度下,公司对外报告次数变化导致公司管理当局进行决策的选择行为。由于外部报告产生的资本市场压力会直接或间接影响管理人员的决策行为和决策动机,当决策项目产生的会计盈余时与公司未来长期盈余之间存在矛盾,管理者在进行项目决策时,面临外部报告的资本市场压力,内部代理问题和财务分析师的盈利预测相关因素影响,管理者通常选择短期利润最大化的项目而不是选择长期盈余最大项目,从而导致公司管理层的决策短期化。
This article mainly verifies that under the current reporting system in our country, the change of the number of company’s external reports leads to the choice of company management’s decision-making. As the capital market pressure generated by external reports will directly or indirectly affect the decision-making behavior and decision-making motivation of managers, there is a conflict between the accounting earnings arising from the decision-making projects and the future long-term surpluses of the company. When managers make project decisions, they face external Reported capital market pressures, internal agency issues, and financial analyst earnings forecasts, managers often choose short-term profit maximization rather than long-term earnings maximum, resulting in short-term corporate governance decisions.