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为了降低企业员工的事故发生率,政府往往采取强制措施要求雇主增加支付给雇员的补偿津贴,旨在激励雇主努力提高企业的工作安全水平。但信息不对称产生的道德风险及事故不同危险等级等相关因素的存在会抵消企业工作安全水平的提高。本文利用OLS估计,发现提高我国员工补偿津贴会显著增加工伤事故的发生,随着事故危险程度的提高该影响会减弱,对工伤死亡事故的影响显著但影响系数很小。
In order to reduce the incidence of accidents among employees, the government often adopts coercive measures that require employers to increase the compensation allowance paid to employees in order to motivate employers to work hard to improve their work safety. However, the moral hazard arising from the asymmetric information and the existence of relevant risk factors such as accident level will offset the improvement of the working safety of enterprises. Using OLS estimation, this paper finds that raising employee reimbursement allowance in our country can significantly increase the incidence of work-related accidents. With the increase of accident risk, the impact will be weakened, but the impact on work-related injuries is significant but the impact coefficient is small.