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为研究产品可拆卸性对再制造决策的影响,本文针对OEM(Original Equipment Manufacturer,原始设备制造商)再制造(Model M),IO(Independent Operation,第三方独立再制造商)再制造(Model R),OEM和IO共同再制造(Model C)这三种再制造模式,在考虑不同产品可拆卸性策略时,运用Stackelberg博弈研究了OEM为主导作用时OEM利润的变化规律。研究表明OEM再制造决策取决于不同产品可拆卸性策略的固定投资成本差额和市场规模。当不同产品可拆卸性策略作用下的OEM初始固定投资成本差额较小,采取可拆卸性高的产品再制造策略可以提升OEM的利润;反之可拆卸性低的产品再制造策略更优。当市场规模较小时,OEM在Model R中获利最高;反之,OEM在Model M中获利更高。在Model C中产品之间的竞争程度不受初始固定投资成本差额和市场规模的影响,OEM获利最低。通过算例分析在初始固定投资成本差额和市场规模作用下OEM的利润波动规律,为核心企业再制造策略的选取提供依据。
In order to study the impact of product disassembly on remanufacturing decision-making, this paper aims at OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) Model M, IO (Independent Operation) ) And OEM (Model C). The Stackelberg game is used to study the variation of OEM profit when OEM is the dominant factor when considering different product disassembly strategies. Research shows that OEM remanufacturing decisions depend on the fixed investment cost gap and market size of different product disassembly strategies. When the initial fixed investment cost of OEM under different product disassembly strategies is small, the remanufacturing strategy with high disassembly can improve the profit of OEM. On the contrary, the product with low disassembly is better in remanufacturing strategy. OEMs monetize Model R best when the market is small; OEMs, on the other hand, monetize Model M more. The level of competition between products in Model C is unaffected by the initial fixed investment cost gap and the size of the market, with OEMs earning the least. Through the example analysis, the fluctuation rule of the OEM profit under the initial fixed investment cost difference and the market size provides the basis for the selection of remanufacturing strategy of the core enterprise.