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积极开展R&D活动是企业在全球化的竞争局面和日新月异的市场环境下,保持长期竞争能力、增强自我活力的有效手段。然而由于R&D活动本身具有高风险性和收益跨期等特点,其中的代理问题更加严重。本文选取了2009-2013年深沪A股制造业上市公司为样本,实证研究了高管激励和企业R&D投入的关系。研究发现,在制造业上市公司中,高管薪酬激励和持股激励与企业R&D投入显著正相关,其中R&D投入和高管持股比例的相关关系更强;国有企业中存在高管激励失效的问题,高管激励与企业R&D投入没有显著的相关关系。最后,本文基于研究结果提出了针对性建议。
Actively carrying out R & D activities is an effective means for enterprises to maintain their long-term competitive edge and enhance their vitality under the conditions of global competition and ever-changing market environment. However, due to the R & D activities itself has the characteristics of high risk and benefits over time, the agency problem is even more serious. This paper chooses the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share manufacturing from 2009 to 2013 as a sample to empirically study the relationship between executive incentive and R & D investment. The research shows that executive compensation incentives and shareholding incentives are significantly and positively correlated with the R & D investment in manufacturing listed companies, of which R & D investment and executive shareholding ratio are more relevant. In the state-owned enterprises, senior executive incentive failure Problem, executive incentive and corporate R & D investment no significant correlation. Finally, this article puts forward the pertinent suggestion based on the research result.