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运用博弈论中委托—代理理论对股权—债权条件下风险投资的激励机制进行了系统分析.根据风险投资家提供股权—债权与风险企业家提供股权融资的假设条件构造了一个基本博弈模型,并对模型进行了推广.研究发现:风险企业家的投资不仅有融资功能,而且还可以作为一种信号传递改变风险投资家的投资信念,使之对项目前景更乐观;扩展模型比基本模型更能改善风险企业家的投资行为,使之投入更多资金和给予风险投资家更高激励;此外,扩展模型更能消除股权—债权投资比例的相互替代性.
This paper uses the theory of principal-agent in game theory to analyze the incentive mechanism of venture capital under equity-debt condition.A basic game model is constructed according to the assumption that venture capitalists provide equity-debt and venture capital provide equity financing The model is promoted.The study found that: venture capitalists not only have the financing function of financing, but also as a signal transfer to change the investment trust of venture capitalists, making it more optimistic about the prospects of the project; expansion model is more than the basic model Improve the venture capitalist’s investment behavior, make it invest more funds and give venture capitalists a higher incentive; In addition, the extended model can even eliminate the share-equity ratio of alternative substitution.