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本文追溯了英国工党始于 80年代中期从对欧洲一体化怀有明显敌意转向亲欧政党的历史演变过程 ,进而探讨了 1997年大选后工党欧洲政策的走向 ,着重分析了其欧洲政策的这一重大转变的原因。作者认为工党的亲欧转变是欧共体、英国国内政治和工党自身三个层次互动的结果 ,以意识形态、思维方式为主要内容的政治文化因素在这一进程中起了重要作用。首先 ,英国工党内部“第三条道路”的兴起 ,使其能够摆脱旧有教条的束缚 ,接受欧共体 (欧盟 )这一以自由主义市场经济原则为主要特征的跨国机构。与此同时 ,80年代中后期欧共体在法国社会党人德洛尔的领导下也开始了带有社会民主主义取向的改革。欧盟和英国工党在政治文化和政策主张上的趋同直接促成了工党的亲欧转变。同时 ,工党的亲欧转变和新工党“第三条道路”是相互促进的 ,亲欧演变也促进了其自身的现代化。我们也应看到尽管工党在主流上已经演变为一个在基本立场上亲欧的政党 ,但由于英国国内政治传统和现实的制约 ,在至关重要的单一货币问题上布莱尔政府仍只能采取观望政策 ,远未实现其大选中提出的“要处于欧洲的中心 ,发挥领导作用”的承诺
This article traced the historical evolution of the British Labor Party’s shift from having a clear hostility toward European integration toward pro-European parties in the mid-1980s. Then it explored the Labor Party’s European policy toward the post-1997 election, focusing on the analysis of its European policy Reasons for major changes. The author thinks that the pro-European transformation of the Labor Party is the result of the interaction between the EC, the domestic politics and the Labor Party itself. The political and cultural factors with the ideology and mode of thinking as the main contents play an important role in this process. First of all, the rise of “the third road” within the British Labor Party allowed it to get rid of the shackles of the old dogma and accept the European Union (EU), a multinational institution that is characterized by the principle of liberal market economy. In the meantime, under the leadership of the German Socialist Demher in the mid-to-late 1980s, the EC also started a social-democratic reform. The convergence of the EU and British Labor parties on political culture and policy propositions has directly contributed to the pro-European Labor Party’s transformation. At the same time, the pro-European transformation of the Labor Party and the “third road” of the New Labor Party promoted each other. The pro-European evolution also promoted its own modernization. We should also see that although the Labor Party has evolved in the mainstream as a pro-European political party in its basic position, the Blair administration can only wait and see on the single issue of currency due to the constraints of British domestic political tradition and reality Policy, far from fulfilling the promises made in its general election that “we should be at the center of Europe and play a leading role”