为了研究价格单独能够提供多少关于质量的信息,本文建立一个静态的完全竞争模型,通过对它的分析证明发现,由于商家和消费者之间存在信息不对称,商家拥有更多的信息,消费者处于不利的地位,不考虑诸如商誉和质量保证等其它因素的影响,价格本身对质量的显示功能是很弱的。 In order to study how much the price alone can provide information about quality, this paper establishes a static perfect competition model, through its analysis proved that due to the existence of information asymmetry between businesses and consumers, businesses have more information, consumers At a disadvantage, the price itself has a weak display of quality, regardless of other factors such as goodwill and quality assurance.