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政府、电网企业与农村居民是农村居民电价政策中的核心利益相关者,三方在博弈中各自衡量着切身利益,并且极力追求自身利益的最大化。首先,我们通过建立政府与电网公司在居民电价补贴政策中的利益博弈模型,分析出“控制—混合”为其利益博弈的均衡点;其次,对高补贴政策、低补贴政策和混合补贴政策的城乡居民利益进行了实证比较分析,进一步证明了混合居民电价补贴政策应该成为政府的首选策略;最后,就我国目前状况分析了城乡居民电价的合理差别。
The government, power grid enterprises and rural residents are the core stakeholders in the rural residents’ electricity price policy. The three parties each measure their immediate interests in the game and strive to maximize their own interests. First of all, through the establishment of the game model of interest between the government and power grid companies in the household electricity price subsidy policy, we analyze the equilibrium point of the “control-mix” for their interest game. Secondly, we analyze the high subsidy policy, low subsidy policy and mixed subsidy Policy of the urban and rural residents have carried out empirical comparative analysis of benefits, further evidence that the mixed household electricity price subsidy policy should become the government’s preferred strategy; Finally, the current situation in China analyzed the reasonable differences between urban and rural residents of electricity prices.