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在中国国家主导的金融体制下,在股票市场上市成为国有企业筹集外界资金的途径。很多企业,包括非国有企业或私人企业,在通过银行和股票市场集资时面临严重的限制。这种高度歧视的金融压制的政策助长了以融资为动机的收购合并。原因是那些没有上市的企业,尤其是私人企业,利用收购上市公司的大宗股份作为走向股票市场的途径。它们在上市后倾向于立刻配股发行和向银行借贷。但是,收购后的筹集资金运作似乎未能改善公司的营运绩效。被国有企业收购而在收购后配股发行的公司的利润更显示出倒退迹象。这表示渴望得到资金的收购者未能有效地运用所得到的资金。
Under China’s state-led financial system, listing on the stock market has become a way for state-owned enterprises to raise external funds. Many businesses, including non-state-owned or private enterprises, face serious constraints in raising funds through the banking and stock markets. This highly discriminatory financial repression policy fueled a financing-motivated merger of acquisitions. The reason is that those not listed, especially private enterprises, take advantage of the acquisition of large shares of listed companies as a way to go to the stock market. After listing, they tend to immediately issue shares and borrow money from banks. However, the post-acquisition fundraising efforts do not seem to improve the company’s operating performance. The profits of companies that were acquired by state-owned enterprises but were issued after the rights issue further showed signs of regression. This means that acquirers eager to get funding have not been able to effectively use the funds they have received.