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本文利用2002~2010年间在我国35个大中城市任职的市长和市委书记的详细个人信息,以及城市房价和经济基本面指标等数据,研究了官员任期和政绩压力对城市房价的影响。本文研究发现,官员任期和政绩压力对城市房价均有显著影响。具体而言,官员任期与城市房价存在倒U型关系,官员的政绩压力对房价有显著的正向影响。并且在官员任期较短时,政绩压力会加剧官员任期对城市房价的正向促进作用;而当任期较长时,政绩压力又会阻碍官员任期对城市房价的反向抑制作用。本文的结论通过了多种稳健性分析。
This article uses the personal and personal information of mayors and party secretaries serving in 35 large and medium-sized cities from 2002 to 2010 in China as well as city house prices and economic fundamentals indexes to study the influence of official term and performance pressure on urban house prices. This study finds that the tenure and performance pressure of officials have a significant impact on urban housing prices. Specifically, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between official tenure and city house prices, and official performance pressure has a significant positive impact on house prices. And when the term of office of official is short, the performance pressure will exacerbate the positive promotion effect of official term on urban house price. When the term is longer, the performance pressure will hinder the official reprieve the reverse inhibition of city house price. The conclusion of this paper has passed many kinds of robustness analysis.