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本文试图探寻,有哪些因素影响了地级市市长的政治升迁,如何影响以及在多大程度上影响了升迁?同时,本研究还期待去发现较为全面的地方领导升迁模式。基于现有的解释模型和邓小平“干部四化”政策,本研究首先描述了全国268个地级城市中264名市长的个人背景、教育背景、工作经历以及他们的政治升迁状况。其次,更为重要的,那些在事实上影响了升迁的因素得到了验证。在统计上,多元线性回归模型证实了下列假设:1.“干部四化”政策对市长的政治升迁有实质性的效果;2.特定的工作经历可能是官员升迁的必需条件,但不会显著降低他们的升迁速度。现有的研究往往将行政区域的经济绩效与当地行政首长的政治升迁描述为一种因果关系,即较好的经济绩效会提高升迁的可能性,而本研究则提供了另外一种可能的解释(假设3):官员升迁得越快,就会到经济发展水平越好的城市担任市长。由于官员的升迁速率在事实上是先于他们作为市长之任命,因此这个变量被用来预测他们所要担任市长之城市的经济发展水平。数据分析证实了假设3,从而提出了一个分析中国地方政治精英升迁问题更加全面的模式。综合以前的研究发现,我们有理由认为,一方面,官员以前在升迁方面的优势将会有助于他们到一个有较好经济绩效的城市去担任市长;另一方面,这种经济的上优势又将转变成下一次政治升迁的有利砝码。
This article tries to find out what factors influence the political promotion of prefecture-level city mayors, and how it affects and to what extent has the promotion been affected? At the same time, this study also seeks to find a more comprehensive mode of local leadership and promotion. Based on the existing explanatory model and Deng Xiaoping “cadre ’s four ” policy, this study first describes the personal background, educational background, work experience and their status of political promotion of 264 mayors in 268 prefecture-level cities nationwide. Second, and more importantly, those factors that in fact have affected the promotion have been validated. In statistical terms, the multiple linear regression model confirms the following assumptions: 1. The “cadres and the four policies” have a substantive effect on the mayor’s political promotion; 2. Specific work experience may be necessary for the promotion of officials, but Will not significantly reduce their promotion speed. The existing research often describes the economic performance of the administrative region as the causal relationship with the political promotion of the local executive heads. That is, the better economic performance will increase the possibility of promotion, while the present study provides another possible explanation (Hypothesis 3): The sooner officials move up, they will become mayors in cities with better economic development. As the official promotion rate was actually preceded by their appointment as mayor, this variable was used to predict the level of economic development of the city in which they are to be mayors. Data analysis confirms Hypothesis 3, thus proposing a more comprehensive model for analyzing the issue of promotion of Chinese political elites. Based on previous studies, we have reason to believe that, on the one hand, officials’ previous advantages in promotion will help them to become mayors in a city with better economic performance; on the other hand, this economic The advantage, in turn, will be transformed into a favorable weight for the next political advance.