大多数经济学家认为反倾销政策的经济学基础是相当薄弱的。与此相反,本文指出虽然在本国厂商与外国厂商的博弈过程中,反倾销政策的存在可能导致进口商品价格的提高,但政府完全可以通过承担反倾销过程成本消除价格扭曲。并且,在外国生产者的成本信息不为国内厂商所了解的情况下,反倾销政策方便了信息传递,从而有可能提高国内产业结构调整的效率。 Most economists think the economic basis of anti-dumping policies is rather weak. On the contrary, this paper points out that though the anti-dumping policy may lead to the increase of the price of imported goods during the game between domestic manufacturers and foreign manufacturers, the government can completely eliminate the price distortions by taking the anti-dumping process cost. And, when the cost information of foreign producers is not known to the domestic manufacturers, the anti-dumping policy facilitates the transfer of information, which may increase the efficiency of domestic industrial restructuring.