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对电力市场改革中发电企业的竞价行为进行了分析,认为发电企业间竞争疲弱、默契合谋行 为产生的原因是:发电企业、电网企业和监管部门之间有关交易行为和股权结构的信息不对称。文 中分别计算了该发电行业名义性和实质性集中度指标HHI,结合相关企业间交互参股的经验考 察,得出了有意义的结论:该发电行业名义上处于弱寡头竞争市场,实质上处于发电投资公司实质 性控股的强寡头竞争市场。为了保证电力市场交易的竞争性和有效率,在短期无法改变发电企业 间股权结构的前提下,文中给出了治理发电企业间默契合谋行为的3条微调交易规则的对策:一是 改变市场现货结算方式;二是改变发电企业申报电价和出力的方式;三是改变现货成交电量的构成 方式。
This paper analyzes the bidding behavior of power generation enterprises during the electricity market reform. The reason is that the competition between power generation enterprises is weak and the tacit conspiracy behavior is caused by the asymmetric information about the transaction behavior and ownership structure between power generation enterprises, power grid enterprises and regulatory authorities. In this paper, we calculate the nominal and substantive concentration index HHI of the power generation industry separately and combine with the empirical investigation of interactive participation among related enterprises. The conclusion is significant: The power generation industry is nominally in a weak oligopolistic market and is essentially in power generation A duly competitive market that is substantially controlled by investment companies. In order to ensure the competitiveness and efficiency of the electricity market transactions, under the premise of not being able to change the ownership structure of power generation enterprises in the short term, the article gives three countermeasures to regulate the trading rules of tacit collusion between power generation enterprises. The first is to change the spot market Settlement method; the second is to change the power generation companies to declare the price and output; third is to change the composition of the spot transaction power.