论文部分内容阅读
This thesis introduces dynamic frameworks into representative matching models-two-sided matching markets with or without transfers,and trading networks.The first essay introduces a model for multi-period many-to-one matching with transfers,and studies stability and efficiency for dynamic matchings.We establish the connections between the competitive equilibria and recursive core with transfers,and find that the substitutability introduced in this essay is sufficient to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria and recursive core with transfers for underlying economic environments.Moreover,we show that the recursive core with transfers results in efficient outcomes.The second essay introduces a model for two-sided one-to-one dynamic matchings with complete information.We introduce a new notion of stability called submatching credible group stability（SCGS）based on the definition of matching rule（MR）that consider not only the stability of the on-path outcomes,but also the impact of the off-path outcomes.SCGS is stronger than one-shot group stability（OSGS）and credible group stability（CGS）in Kurino（2009,2020）.Then,we discuss the relationship of these notions,and show a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of submatching credibly group stable matching rules.The third essay introduces a model for dynamic trading networks with complete information which can be seen as multi-sided many-to-many matchings with transfers.We propose a new solution concept of stability called submatching dynamic group stability（SDGS）,based on the matching rules we define that consider not only the stability of the on-path outcomes,but also the impact of the off-path outcomes.We show the existence of competitive equilibria as well as matching rules that satisfy SDGS under the notion of substitutability introduced in this essay.