建国后,中央与地方关系一直处于动态调整和不断变化之中。改革开放通过机制变迁解决了地方政府发展经济的激励问题,为“中国模式”和“中国道路”的生成提供了坚强的制度支撑,但同时也强化了地方政府的机会主义行为倾向,为中央调控增加了困难。“一放就乱、一收就死”模式不再能全面概括中央地方关系的新景象,简单收权也很难有效规避地方行为,地方治理失控成为全社会高度关注的难题。中央政府必须从顶层重新审视和设计中央地方关系,通过优化地方治理结构来调节地方政府行为。 Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the relations between the central and local governments have been dynamically adjusted and constantly changing. Through the mechanism change, the reform and opening up solved the motivation of the local government in economic development, which provided strong institutional support for the formation of “China Pattern” and “China Road”, but also reinforced the opportunist behavior of local governments , Which added difficulties to the central control. The model of “letting go as soon as it is over and then close to death” can no longer comprehensively summarize the new phenomenon of central-local relations. It is also very difficult to evade local behavior effectively by simply controlling power and the uncontrollable loss of local governance has become a problem of great concern to the entire society. The central government must re-examine and design the central-local relations from the top and adjust the behavior of local governments by optimizing the local governance structure.