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废旧工业产品的回收再制造活动具有较大的正向外部经济特性,常常导致企业从事该项活动的动力不足。从节约资源和保护环境的目的出发,各国政府大都制定了给予补贴以鼓励回收再制造活动的政策。而且新产品和再制造产品一般具有一定的感知价值差异,可能会影响到再制造成本优势的发挥。将政府也作为一个决策主体,建立了以政府为领导者、制造商和再制造商、回收商为跟随者的三级非线性闭环供应链上的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,其中嵌套了基于委托代理关系分析基本技术框架的再制造商对回收商回收努力的最优激励契约。分析求解了政府和制造商、再制造商等的最优决策。政府的补贴政策将有效提高再制造品的竞争优势,同时有效降低废旧产品的掩埋等处理成本,有利于生态环境的保护。政府最优补贴下再制造商对回收商的最优激励机制设计可以有效提高废旧工业品的回收再制造效率。新产品和再制造产品的相互替代程度将间接影响到政府的最优补贴决策。同时通过数值分析得到再制造的比较成本优势对闭环供应链决策的影响。可供政府有关部门在政策制定以及闭环供应链上的企业决策时参考。
The recovery and remanufacturing of used and used industrial products has a large positive external economic characteristic and often leads to insufficient motivation for engaging in such activities. Starting from the goal of saving resources and protecting the environment, most governments have formulated policies that subsidize and encourage recycling and remanufacturing activities. And new products and remanufactured products generally have some perceived value differences, may affect the re-manufacturing cost advantages. The government is also used as a decision-making body to establish a Stackelberg game model based on the three-level nonlinear closed-loop supply chain with government as the leader, manufacturer and remanufacturer, and recyclers as followers. Recipient Analysis of Optimal Incentives for Recycling Recycling Efforts by Remanufacturers in a Basic Technical Framework. Analyze and solve the government and manufacturers, remanufacturers and other optimal decision-making. The government’s subsidy policy will effectively improve the competitive advantage of remanufactured products, meanwhile effectively reduce the disposal cost of waste products such as landfill, which is beneficial to the protection of ecological environment. Under optimal government subsidies, the optimal incentive mechanism design for recyclers by remanufacturers can effectively improve the efficiency of recycling and remanufacturing waste industrial products. The mutual replacement of new products and remanufactured products will indirectly affect the government’s optimal subsidy decision. At the same time, through the numerical analysis, the influence of comparative cost advantage of remanufacturing on closed-loop supply chain decision-making is obtained. For the relevant government departments in policy-making and closed-loop supply chain business decisions for reference.