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本文以英国175家上市公司1999～2002年的数据为样本,采用标准普尔评价记分卡综合评估公司内部治理情况,并据此研究公司治理变动对现金持有水平以及超额现金持有的市场价值的影响。研究结果表明,公司治理的改善会防止管理人员持有大量的现金储备,而公司治理水平本身与现金持有量正相关。较高的公司治理水平与治理水平的改善均起到了提高持有超额现金储备价值的作用,证实了詹森(Jensen,1986)自由现金流代理成本的观点。这一结果说明公司治理结构的变动比治理水平本身更能起到降低代理成本,约束管理者行为的作用。单纯地为了符合监管部门政策要求而采取的治理措施未必能给企业带来更高的价值。
This paper takes the data from 175 listed companies in the United Kingdom from 1999 to 2002 as a sample, and uses the Standard & Poor’s evaluation scorecard to comprehensively assess the internal governance of the company. Based on this, it studies the corporate governance changes to the cash holding level and the market value of excess cash holdings. influences. The results of the study indicate that improvement in corporate governance will prevent managers from holding large amounts of cash reserves, and the level of corporate governance itself is positively correlated with cash holdings. Higher levels of corporate governance and improvement in governance both played a role in increasing the value of holding excess cash reserves, confirming Jensen’s (1986) view of free cash flow agency costs. This result shows that the change of corporate governance structure can play a more important role in reducing agency costs and constraining managers’ behavior than governance level itself. The governance measures taken solely to meet the regulatory agency’s policy requirements may not necessarily bring higher value to the company.