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以2007~2009年A股民营上市公司为样本,按所有者与经营者来源关系统计了民营上市公司的关系治理模式,并实证分析了“关系”对代理成本和代理效率的影响。结果发现随着实际控制人与总经理的关系亲密度递减,代理成本和代理效率都递增。亲人总经理能有效降低代理成本,外人总经理的代理效率最高,而统计发现熟人总经理的聘用比例最高。实证研究还表明,民营上市企业的公司治理机制没有能够改变“关系”的治理作用,在股权较集中的情况下,随着公司规模的扩大,聘用外部职业经理人是最优的选择。
Taking the A-share private listed companies from 2007 to 2009 as a sample, the relationship governance model of private listed companies was statistically analyzed according to the source relationship between the owner and the operator, and the impact of “relationship ” on the agency costs and agency efficiency was analyzed empirically. As a result, it is found that as the intimacy of the relationship between the actual controller and the general manager decreases, the agency costs and agency efficiency increase. Relatives, general manager can effectively reduce agency costs, foreign general manager of the highest efficiency agent, and Statistics found that acquaintances, the highest proportion of hiring general manager. The empirical study also shows that the corporate governance mechanism of private listed companies can not change the governance role of “relationship ”. In the case of concentrated equity, employing the external professional managers is the best choice as the size of the company expands.