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中国煤炭市场处于转型的关键时期,由于缺乏市场监管和配套法规制度不完善等原因,电煤市场主体容易形成利益联盟,文章就建立串谋行为的电煤市场监管模型,有效防止市场串谋行为进行了深入研究。以当前煤炭大省资源整合为背景,分析大型煤炭企业串谋行为对交易价格的影响,溢价水平与串谋联盟的市场份额成正比,与市场需求弹性成反比;进而探讨我国电煤市场规制模型,提出了确定合理强度的经济惩罚来有效抑制市场串谋行为的方法,该方法对于电煤市场运营和市场监管均具有重要的借鉴意义。最后对建立和完善我国电煤市场监管体系提出几点建议。
Due to the lack of market supervision and the imperfect laws and regulations of the supporting systems, the coal market players tend to form a coalition of interests. The paper establishes a coal market supervision model of conspiracy to effectively prevent market collusion Conducted in-depth study. Based on the current resource integration of big coal provinces in China, this paper analyzes the effect of conspiracy on the transaction price. The level of premium is proportional to the market share of conspiracy alliance and inversely proportional to market demand elasticity. Then, , Put forward a method of determining the economic punishment of reasonable strength to effectively suppress collusion in the market. This method is of great significance to both the coal market operation and the market supervision. Finally, it puts forward some suggestions on establishing and perfecting the supervisory system of coal electricity in our country.