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针对政府规制下由制造商、销售商、消费者、回收商和处理商构成的电器电子产品闭环供应链,分析了供应链中各主体的利润,并基于蛛网模型研究了政府与处理商之间的重复博弈过程,求得该博弈的均衡解。在此基础上分析了政府的WEEE处理补贴策略,结果表明:在处理商愿意响应WEEE处理补贴政策的前提下,政府降低对处理商实现的再生利用率的敏感程度或提高单位WEEE处理补贴上限,都能提高均衡状态下的WEEE再生利用率;若政府为了片面追求WEEE再生利用率最大化而不断提高处理补贴,将有损社会福利,且随着WEEE处理补贴的提高,社会福利损失也越大。
Aiming at the closed-loop supply chain of electrical and electronic products made up of manufacturers, sellers, consumers, recyclers and processors under the government regulation, the profit of each subject in the supply chain is analyzed and the relationship between the government and the processors is studied based on the cobweb model The repeated game process, find the equilibrium solution of the game. On this basis, the government’s WEEE treatment subsidy strategy is analyzed. The results show that under the precondition that the processor is willing to respond to the WEEE treatment subsidy policy, the government reduces the sensitivity to the recycling rate realized by the processor or increases the upper limit of WEEE treatment subsidy, Can increase the WEEE regeneration rate under a balanced condition. If the government continues to raise the treatment subsidies to maximize the WEEE recycling rate, the social welfare will be undermined. And as WEEE treatment subsidies increase, the social welfare losses will also be larger .