Abstract： Confucian translation and overseas Confucian studies have always been inseparable from each other. The English versions of Confucian classics such as the Analects are not only a primer for many Western Confucian scholars but a chief source for many Confucian scholars to study Confucianism as well. Some Confucian researchers in the United States use translated texts to transmit Confucianism through academic research. From the Confucius and the Analects： New Essays compiled by Bryan W. Van Norden， it can be seen that the chief source on which the researchers base their work are the translations of Confucian classics by James Legge， Arthur Waley， Roger T. Ames， D. C. Lau， and many others. Their studies are mainly centered on the archaic meanings and new interpretations of Confucian ethics such as li， ren， dao， and xiao and the interpretation of Confucian philosophy as well， in which there are both philological and archaeological research and interpretive research， as well as Chinese and Western comparative research on philosophy. The studies show that Confucianism is valued by the academic community in the West and provides reference for Western ethical studies， and also that Confucian ethics is gradually becoming part of Western philosophy and ethics.
　　Keywords： translation， Confucian ethics， interpretation， spread of Confucianism
　　Bryan W. Van Norden， who has been engaged in the study of Chinese philosophy for decades， edited and published Confucius and the Analects： New Essays in 2002， collecting papers from eleven contemporary American sinology researchers. They are respectively E. Bruce Brooks， professor with Massachusetts State University who has been engaged in the study of pre-Qin literature; Mark Csikszentmihalyi， professor who specializes in religious study and Laozi philosophy at the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures of the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Philip J. Ivanhoe， professor with the University of Michigan who does research in religion， philosophy， and Asian studies; Joel J. Kupperman， who studies Chinese and Western philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of Connecticut State University; Robert B. Louden， researcher of Kant’s philosophy at Southern Maine State University; Lisa A. Raphals， researcher in comparative study of world literature at the Department of Comparative Literature and Foreign Languages at California State University; Joe Sahleen， a Confucian researcher at the Department of Asian Studies of Stanford University; Bryan W. Van Norden， professor of philosophy with the Wasal College of Asian Studies; Kwong-loi Shun， professor of Confucianism studies at the University of California， Berkeley; Steven A. Wilson， who studies Christian ethical philosophy at the Jesus School and the Honer School of the University of Valparaiso; and Lee H. Yearley， researcher in religious studies at Stanford University. From the subjects discussed in their papers， we can glimpse the basic viewpoints and methods of overseas research in Confucianism in the English language and the relationship between Confucianism and Western philosophy and ethics as well. 　　The papers collected in the Confucius and the Analects： New Essays show that these researchers conducted Confucian studies in a serious and in-depth manner， with positive attitude toward the value of Confucianism. There are roughly five types of questions discussed in this anthology.
　　Exploring the Text of the Analects [Refer to page 44 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
　　Philip J. Ivanhoe’s “Whose Confucius？ Which Analects？” can be described as a study of the Analects within the Chinese tradition of Confucian studies. The object of his research is the meaning of wenzhang 文章， xing 性， and tiandao 天道 in Analects 5：13： “Zigong said， ‘Master’s articles are available and heard. Confucius’s words and nature and the Way of Heaven are not available’ （子貢曰：‘夫子之文章，可得而闻也。夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也’）.” He examines traditional interpretations by He Yan 何晏 （190–249）， Cheng Yi 程颐 （1033–1107）， Cheng Hao 程颢 （1032–1085）， Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200）， Dai Zhen 戴震 （1724–1777）， and Zhang Xuecheng 章学诚 （1738–1801）， discusses their differences， and puts forth his own views. According to Ivanhoe， He Yan’s interpretation was mostly Daoist， and that of Zhu Xi and other Confucians in both Song and Ming dynasties were greatly influenced by Buddhism. Only Zhang Xuecheng believed that Confucius spoke of people and things in the real world and never directly talked about abstract truths such as human nature and the Way of Heaven， though his speech was always related to abstract truth. Therefore， Ivanhoe argues that the interpretation of the Confucian classics should systematically and thoroughly depend on the study and exegeses of the classics of the commentators. Contemporary Chinese and foreign translators do not systematically refer to the study of scholarship in different historical periods when translating these classics. In addition， there is a lack of theoretical guidance in translation so that the translated texts often give false impressions to their readers about Chinese thought. Finally， Ivanhoe proposes that interpretation of the classic texts such as the Analects must be done by first clarifying two questions beforehand： Whose Confucius and which Analects are you to interpret？ This reflects his historical perspective on the study of the Confucian classics.
　　E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks’s “Word Philology and Text Philology in Analects 9：1” is centered on Analects 9：1： “The Master seldom spoke of li （profit） or ming （fate， that which is ordained） or ren （子罕言利，与命，与仁）.” It discusses the philological and philosophical problems in the text of the Analects through an intertextual methodology. Some similar sentences in the Analects are listed： “If a gentleman departs from ren， how shall he establish a name？ （君子去仁，恶乎成名）” （4：4）; “The gentlemen concentrates on what is right; the little man concentrates on advantage （君子喻于义，小人喻于利）” （4：16）; “Those who act with a view to their own personal advantage will arouse much resentment （放于利而行，多怨）” （4：12）; “To use what the people find profitable to profit them， is this not [to be] kindly but not extravagant？ （因民之所利而利之，斯不亦惠而不费乎）” （20：2）; “Unfortunately his allotted span was short and he has died （不幸短命死矣）” （6：3， 11：7）; “He will return his charge （必复命）” （10：3）; “At fifty I understood the commands of Heaven （五十而知天命）” （2：4）. Through intertextual analysis， the Brooks’s paper attempts to prove that Confucius did not， in fact， only rarely talk about profit， or ordained fate or virtue， and moves forward to clarify the meanings of such key concepts as ren. The Brooks held that individual words of the Analects should be viewed from the text as a whole， which in turn is part of the entire system of Confucian texts. This is actually a traditional method of exegesis of the Confucian classics， from which researchers may learn today. 　　Mark Csikszentmihalyi’s “Confucius and the Analects in the Hàn” quotes a large number of historical materials to discuss the functional evolution of the Analects since the Spring and Autumn period （770–221 BCE） to the Han dynasty （206 BCE–220 CE）， and focuses on its social， political， and official education functions in the Han dynasty. Csikszentmihalyi’s quotation also includes the Records of the Grand Historian [史記]， New Preface [新序]， Garden of Sayings [说苑]， Records of Confucius in the Three Courts [孔子三朝记]， School Sayings of Confucius [孔子家语]， the Record of Ritual [礼记]， Elder Dai’s Book of Rites [大戴礼记]， Model Sayings [法言]， and the bamboo slip Analects unearthed at Mawangdui， by which he explains the process of shaping the image of Confucius as a saint in the Western Han dynasty （206 BCE–25 CE）. It also introduces the Gongyang’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals [春秋公羊传] to show that Gongyang Gao 公羊高， the commentator， shaped Confucius into a uncrowned king and law giver. With establishment of the canonicity of the Five Classics and the official system of scholarly authority at the beginning of the Han dynasty， the “weft texts” or apocrypha （weishu 纬书） like the Models of Confucius and His Disciples [孔子徒人图发]， Kongqiu’s Secret Classic [孔丘密经]， especially the Classic of Filial Piety’s Right Half of the Wooden Tally [孝经右契]， all portrayed Confucius as a prophet. At the time， the Han rulers regarded the Analects as the textbook for the princes， ministers， and high officials to study literature and learn to obey the rules of propriety. The ruler’s social and political appeals to the Analects made the edition of the Han dynasty and that of the private schools in the Warring States period very different in function. Finally， Csikszentmihalyi comes to talk about Confucius’s attitude toward ghosts and gods， and noting that all Confucian scholars from the Han dynasty to the late Qing dynasty， including Kang Youwei 康有为 （1858–1927）， had different opinions： The Han scholars thought that Confucius was associated with divination customs and adduced his “Appended Phrases” [系辞] to the Book of Changes as evidence; Cheng Yi， Chang Hao， and Zhu Xi believed that Confucius did not believe in God; from book IV of the Analects， Kang Youwei argued that Confucius was a believer in ghosts and gods， and that Confucius’s supposed refusal to talk about ghosts and gods was merely a reading of Confucius influenced by the Buddhist doctrines. Csikszentmihalyi believes that the image of Confucius changed not only from the Warring States period to the Han dynasty， as Gu Jiegang 顾颉刚 （1893–1980） indicated， but also varied among the different social groups within which he was commented on even in the same period. The Analects later began to be related to the education of the heir apparent and the official ceremonial system and bureaucracy， which accounts for why the imperial court chose the Analects as the textbook in the second century BCE and why the influence of the Analects continued to rise in the first century CE. It is worth noting that the purpose of Csikszentmihalyi’s research is not to find proof for the correctness of a certain Confucian tradition in history but to help the reader appreciate the historical role played by Confucius in different historical periods. Csikszentmihalyi believes that， historically， it is reasonable and meaningful to regard Confucius as a saint and an educator. 　　Confucian Ethics [45]
　　In his essay “Rén 仁 and Lǐ 禮 in the Analects，” Kwong-loi Shun discusses specifically the nature and relationship of ren and li 礼 （rites）. He cites Xu Fuguan 徐复观 （1903–1982）， Tang Junyi 唐君毅 （1909–1978）， Lau Sze-kwang 劳思光 （1927–2012）， Zhao Jibin 赵纪彬 （1905–1982）， Arthur Waley， Chen Daqi 陈大齐 （1886–1983）， Roger T. Ames， David L. Hall， and Herbert Fingarette， and classifies their views and their interpretations of ren and li into two categories： instrumental and defining. Instrumental interpretation regards li as a tool and means by which to realize ren， and ren is a sort of human nature that can exist independently of concrete actions. Instrumentalists believe that ren itself has independent and ultimate value， and the value of li existing in society and the value of personal obeying of li come from the instrumental role of li for ren. As a representative of the defining interpretation， Confucius believed that the ideal ren was to follow the prevailing li in Chinese society in his time. Ren is not different from li and can be regarded as human nature and mind independent of li. It cannot be cultivated by obeying li as virtue of benevolence or represented as virtue of benevolence. After citing a large number of sayings from the Analects exemplified in the paper to analyze the two viewpoints， Shun puts forward a third viewpoint， namely that ren and li are not independent of each other， nor are they integrated， but that ren is formed in li and reside in it， as ren is incomprehensible if separated from li and “cannot be shown to have a validity independent of [each other].” This kind of research is not an exegesis or proof-finding but an analytical philosophical approach， which is of great significance for inspiring American scholars and even ordinary readers to deeply understand and explore Confucian ideas and concepts， and is conducive to the transmission of Confucianism.
　　Bryan W. Van Norden’s “Unweaving ‘One Thread’ of Analects 4：15” illustrates the difference between the Western philosophy represented by Plato， Aristotle， and Descartes and Confucian philosophy by analyzing the so-called yiguan 一贯 （consistency） and its subordinating zhong 忠 （loyalty） and shu 恕 （consideration）. Western philosophy is systematic， emphasizing the importance of knowledge， while Confucian philosophy is less systematic. Van Norden’s discussion began with Waley’s initial translation of “one thread” for 一贯 in Analects 4：15： “The Master said， ‘Shen！ My Way has one （thread） that runs right through it.’ Master Zeng said， ‘Yes.’ When the Master had gone out， the disciples asked saying： ‘What did he mean？’ Master Zeng said， ‘Our Master’s Way is simply this： loyalty， consideration’ （子曰：‘参乎，吾道一以贯之！’曾子曰：‘唯。’子出，门人问曰：‘何谓也？’曾子曰：‘夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。’）.” Van Norden， after making a brief analysis of Dai Zhen’s notes on yi 一 and guan 贯 and James Legge’s translation of this chapter， argues against Waley， Lau， and Ivanhoe’s understanding of 一 as consistent and 贯 as a thread that runs through and also argues against translating the phrase as “one thread” on grammatical grounds. Van Norden also asserts that in some contexts there exists a contradiction between zhong and shu. He believes that zhong and shu are not two aspects of Confucius’s so-called the Way， as both have a serious hierarchical dimension： Zhong is a requirement for the inferior to treat the superior， and shu is a requirement for the superior to treat the inferior， as it is said in Analects 3：19 （“The ruler employs the ministers by the rule of propriety， while ministers serve the ruler with loyalty and devotion”）. Van Norden does not further seriously elaborate the meaning and relationship between 一 and 貫， nor does he use the commentaries of the past generations as support for his view， but suggests that this was deliberately fabricated and wedged in by posterity to improve the reputation of Zeng， and that the text， inconsistent with the context， is therefore difficult to understand. He infers that the “one thread” philosophy does not exist in Confucius and concludes that Confucius’s philosophy is less systematic. Although Van Norden’s essay appears sound because it is self-consistent， it relies mostly on taking passages out of context， so is not really based in Confucian texts themselves. His discussion of Confucian thought is completely partial and fails to be aligned with the Confucian ideology and is subjective and arbitrary in its understanding of the meaning and syntax of the original text， and he aliens himself from the traditional exegetical system of Confucian studies. Since the logical premise for his inferences and arguments he cites is incorrect， his conclusion is doomed to be invalid. This represents a way of studying Confucianism in the West—an analytic philosophical study of Confucianism， which still has many problems to be solved. 　　Confucianism and Religious Philosophy [46]
　　Contrasting with Kwong-loi Shun’s focus on Confucian ethics， Robert B. Louden’s “‘What Does Heaven Say？’： Christian Wolff and Western Interpretation of Confucian Ethics” is a study of religious philosophy based on the meaning of the word tian 天 （heaven） in the Analects. Louden examines Christian Wolff， Immanuel Kant， and George W. F. Hegel’s understanding and evaluation of Confucius to study the eighteenth-century Western understanding of Confucius’s “religious” thought. Wolff compared Confucius with Jesus， saying that Confucius discovered the correct moral principles not through revelation or even natural religion， and as a result Wolff was expelled from Germany when his conclusion was made public. Kant assumed that Confucius never created a concept of “morality” and instilled it into the minds of the Chinese people and therefore supposed the Chinese could never reach a noble realm and care about their obligations， and that all Confucius’s ethics were just intolerable moral extremes. Hegel believed that Confucius possessed only some practical and secular wisdom but no speculative philosophy. Louden criticizes Fingarette’s view that Confucius did not talk about tian， believing that the Analects’ discourse about tian forms a coherent whole and that Confucius was an pious religious believer whose morality grew out of his religious views. Confucius asked people to look outward and up at tian if they wanted to secure true morality and thought that ethical norms are based on something that is foreign to us and much more important than human nature， culture， and reason， something that must necessarily be sacred. Therefore Louden concludes that Confucius’s awe in thinking about tian is his most basic religious psychology. From this point of view， found in some American academic circles， Confucianism is as religious as it was in the eyes of Matteo Ricci.
　　New Interpretations of Confucian Ideas [46]
　　Stephen A. Wilson in his “Conformity， Individuality， and the Nature of Virtue： A Classical Confucian Contribution to Contemporary Ethical Reflection” criticizes Fingarette’s view on li and ren. Fingarette believes that if li is to be beautiful and effective， it requires a person to participate in a certain ceremony with skillful techniques. The moral binding force of the words and deeds of li cannot be separated from ceremony. Wilson thinks that Fingarette regards tradition as the sole criterion of li， which is too arbitrary and empty. 　　Wilson also criticizes the views of Roger T. Ames. The latter holds that although the self-cultivators are bound by tradition and its ceremonies， they must evaluate and change tradition to obtain yi 義 （righteousness）. Wilson argues that Roger T. Ames’s understanding of the Analects and its ethical views has overlooked “the community dimension of human prosperity as a whole” in Confucianism. Li is not a model for creatively decorating the already formed self， but an approach to cultivating self through the standards that are commonly acknowledged by the society. Ames has failed to see the point that without the optional communal meaning that already exists in tradition， one could not obtain the meaning that an individual needs from the interests contained in tradition. In the Confucian discourse on li， one can find the basis for the absolute individuality of human prosperity from human beings. On the one hand， this form of individualism is conducive to human prosperity; on the other， it is closely linked to the various reasons that encourage the true morality of which Confucius speaks. Confucians inject everything that is seemingly correct into the personality of a Confucian， but they believe that the specific truth about the status of human in nature and society was discovered by the ancient sages. According to Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor， what makes humans human is that we have the ability to develop ourselves and form second-order desires and to get rid of desire simpliciter. Our ideal humanity has nothing to do with our own desires， tendencies， or choices. Rather， it is the criterion for judging these desires and choices. In the context of Confucianism， the metaphysical， ontological， psychological， and cosmological standards of the ancient great kings provide a normative framework in which value differences become clear and understandable. Wilson holds that in the context of classical Confucianism， true or perfect virtue has two components： one is to do good deeds for the sake of good deeds themselves， and the other is to do good deeds in order to enjoy them， each of which is a necessary condition， and the combination of which a sufficient condition for virtue. Therefore， moral education must respect and cultivate the individuality of the person so as to avoid the possibility of losing morality in the process of cultivating morality： one can achieve moral character when one does not regard good deeds as a tool for achieving other purposes： He can now do good for the sake of doing good. 　　Wilson’s interpretation conforms to the moral requirements of Mencius’s saying， “When in hard times， try to seek self-development; when in success， try to let others be benefit” （Mencius， 7A：9）， and it is obvious that this moral norm is further deepened in the combination of Chinese and Western ethical philosophy. However， Wilson’s individualistic interpretation of Confucianism was later indirectly criticized by Alexus Mcleod， who underscored that ren is a “communal property” discussed in the Analects.
　　Joel J. Kupperman’s “Naturalness Revisited： Why Western Philosophers Should Study Confucius” is quite typical of the diversified interpretation of Confucian naturalness in the West. Kupperman holds that Western philosophers can learn a lot from Confucius’s thought， one point of which is naturalness. “Naturalness” comes from William E. Soothill’s rendering of the word he 和 in his translation of Analects 1：12： “In the usage of decorum it is naturalness that is of Value （礼之用，和为贵）.” In fact， the meaning of 和 refers to the attitude of anyone who is honest and sincere， so rendering 和 as “naturalness” does not reflect the whole of what Confucius thought about it. Regardless of whether Soothill’s translation is accurate or not， the most important is that the translation provides Kupperman with a resource for thinking about naturalness. Kupperman thus presumes that Confucius had a philosophical position on naturalness and that Confucius believed that the soul of li is to be natural in communication with people. He then compares the ideas of Confucian natural communication with the ideas of Aristotle and Nietzsche and argues that ethical choices are only individual games in Aristotle and Nietzsche but multiplayer games in Confucius’s philosophy. He said， “What then is nature？ The word implies a certain ease of behavior， an absence of strain： the agent is reasonably comfortable with her or his own behavior.” Natural attitudes are not only important in ceremonies but also significant politically. It can be seen that Kupperman’s discussion of naturalness is not really a Confucian idea but a mere opinion of his derived from a translation. It is worth noting that， in international Sinology， this sort of discussion of Confucianism triggered by partial translations is not happening only to Kupperman. It is worth exploring how to deal with this phenomenon.
　　Reading Confucius in the Light of Comparative Philosophy [48]
　　Lee H. Yearley’s “An Existentialist Reading of Book 4 of the Analects” is an existentialist interpretation of the ethical concepts of dao 道， filial devotion （xiao 孝）， and death in the Analects， although the meanings in Yearley’s citations are not accurate enough. For example， in Analects 4：1， “Of neighborhoods virtue is the most beautiful. If one does not choose to dwell in virtue， how could one be wise？ （里仁为美，则不处仁，焉得知？），” its overall grasp of Confucius’s ideas is basically correct. Yearley argues that the interpretation of the classics may be based on a fundamentalist approach， and the classics can be connected with reality to guide people’s lives. His method of interpretation is to combine the above two methods， respecting the historical significance of the classic text， seeing its shortcomings， and trying to find something that has guiding significance for human existence. First of all， existentialism holds that likes and dislikes are only reflective reactions for most people. It seems to Confucius that “only virtuous people can have likes and dislikes” （4：3）， for only their likes and dislikes are true senses of good and evil. Regarding the nature of virtue， Yearley argues that there are two kinds of virtues， one is expressive and the other acquisitive. The motivation of expressive virtue is that moral behavior itself expresses the concept of goodness， while the motivation of acquisitive behavior is that it helps the actor get what she or he is seeking for. But the two virtues are not explicitly elaborated in the Analects. In the Confucian writings of later generations， what is usually expressed in language is the acquisitive virtue， but they also discuss how a person chooses an act or lifestyle that expresses his concept of goodness. Obviously， Yearley’s classification of Confucius’s view on virtue is consistent with contemporary Western ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre holds that virtue is an acquired quality and advances a virtue theory in Aristotle’s sense. “A virtue is an acquired human quality， the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” In this way he links Confucius with contemporary Western ethics. In the end， Yearley talks about death as treated in Analects 4：8： “Having heard the Way in the morning， one may die content in the evening （朝闻道，夕死可矣）.” Existentialists posit that people do not see death in their normal vision， and even have no concept of death. Of course， people know that they are destined to die， but they see death only as part of the ontological structure of life， and this understanding has not been grasped in a way that is enough to change their horizons. In understanding life， people’s view of it is merely of existence rather than living or survival. In the words of existentialism， people are still reluctant to choose to die. According to Yearley， Confucian “hearing the Way” （聞道） and the facing of death give rise to a kind of confidence that makes virtuous people not only see their weaknesses that they need to remedy and their actions that need to be recognized but also continue to own the meaning they already have. People of virtue can live by expressive virtue rather than acquisitive virtue. They can live in the world but not belong to it， because they grasp the contingency of the world and the meaning of virtue and of the pursuit of virtue. Therefore Yearley believes that there is existential philosophical significance in the Analects. 　　Lisa A. Raphals’s “A Woman Who Understood the Rites” faithfully studies and describes the moral conduct of Ji Jingjiang of the Lu state in Biographies of Virtuous Women [列女傳]. The main content of the article falls into three parts： “A Woman of Expertise，” “Confucius on Women Who Understood the Rites，” and “Later Lives of Jingjiang.” Through the evaluations of Jingjiang by Confucian scholars of the past， Raphals creatively analyzes the changes of women’s social status from Confucius’s time to the Song and Ming dynasties， affirms Confucius and the early Confucians’ fair attitudes toward the evaluation of women’s status and talents， and points out the prejudice against women in Song–Ming Neo-Confucianism. His research is superficially an evaluation of Ji Jingjiang but in essence is a declaration of her feminist view.
　　Confucian Classic Translations as an Important Source for American Confucian Studies [49]
　　American Sinological Confucian studies are closely related to the translations of Confucian classics. In the course of their research， wherever the original text of the Analects is referred to， it is generally necessary to cite a translation. There are two ways to which the original is referred： One is to discuss the original text of the Analects in philological perspective for the purpose of textual research， and the other is to use the citations from the translations as evidence for the purpose of discussing morality or ethics. The researchers do not have very objective criteria for their citations but mainly see to it that the style of translation is in line with their research purposes. For example， “Naturalness Revisited： Why Western Philosophers Should Study Confucius” mainly refers to Waley’s translation， a total of thirteen times. The Brooks’s “Word Philology and Text Philology in Analects 9：1，” mainly discussing the meaning and history of the chapters formed in the Analects， quotes from The Original Analects： Sayings of Confucius and His Successors thirty-eight times， aside from other English translations. Generally speaking， the researchers’ Confucian studies always involve the text proper of the Analects， so it is almost always necessary for them to read and quote a certain translation. Sometimes， in order to make the discussion more objective and accurate， an author has to cite several translations in the same paper.
　　Confucius and the Analects： New Essays includes a total of eleven papers on Confucianism， each of which involves one or more translations， with a high rate of citation. Among them， “Word Philology and Text Philology in Analects 9：1” refers to almost all the important English translations of the Analects. The anthology as a whole cites various translations of the Analects， the Mencius， the Great Learning， the Doctrine of the Mean， Spring and Autumn Annals， and the Book of Songs. 　　Table 1. Cited Translations in Confucius and the Analects： New Essays
　　Title Translator Publisher Year of Publication Times Cited
　　The Analects D. C. Lau New York： Dorset Press 1986 1
　　Confucius： The Analects D. C. Lau New York： Penguin Books 1979 25
　　Mencius D. C. Lau New York： Penguin Books 1970 4
　　A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy Wing-tsit Chan Princeton： Princeton University Press 1963 1
　　The Book of Songs Arthur Waley New York： Grove Press 1987 1
　　The Analects of Confucius Arthur Waley London： George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1938 7
　　The Analects of Confucius Arthur Waley New York： Vintage Books 1938 32
　　The Analects of Confucius： A Philosophical Translation Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. New York： Balantine 1998 1
　　Confucian Analects， The Chinese Classics James Legge Hong Kong： Hong Kong University Press （reprinted） 1970 9
　　The Chun Tsew with the Tso Chuan James Legge Hong Kong： Hong Kong University Press 1960 5
　　Confucian Analects， The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean James Legge New York： Dover Publications 1971 4
　　The Tso Chuan Burton Watson New York： Columbia University Press 1989 3
　　The Original Analects E. Bruce Brooks and
　　A. Taeko Brooks New York： Columbia University Press 1998 38
　　Confucius Raymond Dawson New York： Hill and Wang 1981 4
　　Confucius Raymond Dawson Oxford： Oxford University Press 1982 1
　　Confucius： The Analects Raymond Dawson Oxford and New York： Oxford University Press 1993 2
　　The Analects of Confucius Simon Leys New York： W. W. Norton & Company 1997 2
　　Confucius William E. Soothill London： Oxford University Press 1910 4
　　The Analects of Confucius Huang Chichung New York and Oxford： Oxford University Press 1997 1
　　Confucius Ezra Pound New York： New Directions PB 1969 1
　　The Sayings of Confucius Lionel Giles London： John Murray 1907 1
　　The Sayings of Confucius James R. Ware New York： New American Library 1955 1
　　The Wisdom of Confucius William Jennings New York： Avenel Brooks 1982 1
　　Although these translations have their respective interpretations of the original text of the Analects， with not a few misunderstandings and distortions of the original text’s meaning， they have been influencing the study of Confucianism in the United States in different ways， and their value is undeniable， as the translations， whether accurate or not， have triggered new interpretations of Confucian thought in the philosophical world， expanding the impact of Confucianism. The translation-based Confucian discussion is often not carried out along a single line， however， with philological study of the texts’ archaic meanings intertwined with research aimed at the modern application of Confucian ethics. The result is that the contemporary significance of Confucianism grows increasingly more evident through research and communication， and the contemporary interpretation and application of Confucianism is increasingly characterized by our times. From this point of view， strengthening contemporary translation of Confucian classics is still of great significance and necessity. 　　Conclusion [51]
　　Judging by the anthology Confucius and the Analects： New Essays， Confucian Studies in Western sinology mainly follows three lines： （1） the study of the meaning of the original text， which is similar to exegetical study in China; （2） interpretive study aimed at extracting new meanings for the purpose of enriching and improving Western philosophical thought; and （3） inventive interpretation of Confucianism in Western philosophical terms. This kind of research often uses an analogical method to prove the rationality of Western philosophy. The researchers mainly applied analytic and comparative approaches prevalent in modern Western philosophy. These methods have the advantage of respecting the text but cannot be free from falling into speculation because of relying too much on logical analysis. It calls our attention to the fact that these studies are generally based on English translations of Confucian classics rather than the Chinese originals. As can be seen， the essays in this collection includes repeated references to the translations of the Analects by James Legge， Arthur Waley， Roger T. Ames， D. C. Lau， Wing-tsit Chan， Simon Leys， William E. Soothill， Raymond Dawson， Ezra Pound， William Jennings， James R. Ware， and Lionel Giles. With various problems left over from the English translations， the results of research do not necessarily conform to what Confucius meant in his time. However， the significance of philosophical research does lie more in finding evidence and proof than in inventive interpretation.
　　Although it is only a part of American Confucianism research， the studies of Confucianism by the American researchers in this collection represent values assumed in foreign Confucianism research： for the enrichment and development of Western philosophy. Their basic research model is to incorporate Confucian ethics into the framework of Western ethical philosophy and to make it play its due role in its native culture. Although the topics studied and the visions applied are mostly not in agreement with Confucian studies in China， from a global perspective， this inconsistency may grow into a powerful branch in the development of Confucianism worldwide.