运用博弈论分析不确定条件下供应链成员的信息共享技术策略。首先建立基于需求不确定和供应不确定两种参数的“供应商+零售商”的期望收益模型,证实在不确定条件下的存在双方期望收益的最优解;建立三阶段博弈模型,探讨双方信息共享技术策略的博弈关系;分析四种的均衡状态:探讨初始需求不确定性、供应商的信息推测能力与零售商收益的不同关系对双方信息共享技术策略的影响,结论显示:当初始需求不确定性较大时,零售商以拒绝策略为先,进一步的策略取决于供应商的信息推测能力及其对零售商收益的影响,如果该能力较强,零售商将采取接受策略,反之则反。 Using Game Theory to Analyze the Information Sharing Strategy of Supply Chain Members Under Uncertainty. Firstly, the expected return model of “supplier + retailer” based on the two parameters of uncertainty of demand and uncertainty of supply is established to confirm the existence of the optimal solution of the expected return between the two parties under uncertain conditions. A three-stage game model is established, Discussing the game relationship between the two sides’ information technology strategy; analyzing the four equilibrium states: discussing the influence of the initial demand uncertainty, the supplier’s information speculation ability and the retailer’s profit on the strategy of information sharing between the two parties. The conclusion shows that when When the initial demand is more uncertain, the retailer takes the rejection strategy as its first priority. The further strategy depends on the supplier’s information speculation ability and its impact on the retailer’s profitability. If this ability is stronger, the retailer will adopt the strategy of acceptance, On the contrary