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自1997年《水工建筑物安全法》施行以来,对所有因失事可能导致出现紧急情况的水工建筑物都必须进行安全等级评估。运行状态和失事风险是基本要素之一,其决定了安全等级。评估大坝状态之后,大体上就可以拟定出保持大坝正常运行状态和安全等级的所有必要措施、预测出水工建筑物的失事场景以及给出状态监控建议,如果需要的话。失事风险是失事概率(或年均失事频率)和失事后果的组合(第三方损失)。优秀的失事风险管理的执行注重两个方面,即减小结构失事概率和减轻失事后果。在第一种情况中,关键因素是大坝状态监察、监测(包括设计用于安全控制的数据诊断系统)、论证、计划和及时的维护。失事后果严重性首先可由组织措施来减轻。同时还应满足下列条件:有关不同失事场景信息及失事的发展过程信息的可获取性(这一信息可从结构物状态和其失事概率评估结果中获取);溃坝洪水波和洪水淹没区参数(如果发生水动破坏);有关可能的第三方损失的信息。笔者以俄罗斯水电集团公司的水工建筑物安全和可靠性管理系统为例,介绍了综合的大坝安全和可靠性支撑方法。也介绍了溃坝风险管理的基本原则和其在俄罗斯水工建筑物可靠性和安全性支撑方面的作用。文中采用了许多高坝案例来叙述安全和可靠性管理的方法,包括基于大坝状态评估结果的方法。
Since the implementation of the Hydraulic Structure Safety Act of 1997, safety classifications must be evaluated for all hydraulic structures that may cause an emergency in the event of a crash. Operating conditions and risk of crashes are one of the basic elements that determine the level of safety. After assessing the state of the dam, it is generally possible to devise all the necessary measures to maintain the normal operation and safety of the dam, to predict the accidental scene of the hydraulic structure and to provide status monitoring recommendations, if necessary. Risk of crashes is the combination of crashes (or average annual crashes) and crashes (third-party losses). The implementation of good crash risk management focuses on two aspects, namely reducing the probability of structural failure and mitigating the consequences of an accident. In the first case, the key factors are dam status monitoring, monitoring (including data diagnostic systems designed for safety control), justification, planning and timely maintenance. The severity of the consequences of the accident can be mitigated first by organizational measures. At the same time, the following conditions should also be met: The availability of information on the development process of different scenarios and information about the accident (information can be obtained from the evaluation of the status of the structure and the probability of its failure); Parameters of dam break flood and flood inundation (If hydrodynamic damage occurs); information on possible third-party losses. Taking the hydropower construction safety and reliability management system of Russia Hydropower Corporation as an example, the author introduces a comprehensive dam safety and reliability support method. The basic principles of dam-break risk management and its role in the reliability and safety of Russian hydraulic structures are also described. Many high-dam cases are used in this paper to describe safety and reliability management methods, including methods based on dam status assessment results.