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文章通过考察基金公司支付给保荐机构的佣金与IPO网下发行获配概率之间的关系,研究了我国IPO配售中的公平性问题。研究结果显示,在IPO前一年,基金公司支付给保荐机构的佣金越多,其获得配售的概率越高,且这一现象主要存在于收益率较高的样本组。由于我国保荐机构并没有自主配售权,文章进一步考察了基金公司为提高获配概率所采取的措施。研究发现,基金公司主要通过提高报价和申购数量的方式达到获配的目的,这一现象亦在收益率较高的样本组中更加明显。上述证据表明,我国IPO配售中存在基金公司与保荐机构结成利益联盟的现象,即保荐机构获得了高额的佣金,基金公司则提前从保荐机构获得发行人的敏感信息,重点参与收益率较高的新股发行项目以获得丰厚的收益。文章的结论对于监管部门改进IPO询价制度具有借鉴价值。
The article studies the fairness issue in China’s IPO placing by examining the relationship between the commission paid by the fund company to the sponsor and the IPO probability distribution. The results show that in the year prior to the IPO, the more commissions fund companies paid to sponsors, the higher the probability of obtaining a placement, and this phenomenon mainly occurs in sample groups with higher yield. As China’s sponsor agencies do not have the right of independent placement, the article further examines the fund companies to increase the probability of allocation measures taken. The study found that fund companies mainly through the quotations and purchase quantity to achieve the purpose of allocation, this phenomenon is also more obvious in the sample group with higher yield. The above evidence shows that there is a phenomenon of alliance between the fund companies and the sponsor institutions in the IPO placing in China, that is, the sponsor institutions get high commissions, and the fund companies obtain the issuer’s sensitive information from the sponsor institutions in advance, with a focus on participating in the rate of return High issue of new shares to get huge profits. The conclusion of the article has reference value for the regulatory authorities to improve IPO inquiry system.