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经理人的报酬不仅具有激励经理人努力工作的作用,而且还应该能够促进经理人市场的均衡,即能够实现能力高的管理者可以获得较高的报酬,否则,企业就不能吸引有能力的管理者留在本企业工作。基于这种想法,我们构造了一个简单的模型来考察均衡后管理者的报酬状况。我们的结论是在一个相当简化的条件下得到的,即国有企业可以花费较少的报酬就可以获得能力高的管理者,但不能说国有企业就一定会选择能力高的管理者,也就是说,不能说国有企业的管理者能力要比民营企业高。如果企业关于市场中高管能力评价的信息是正确的,那么企业高管的报酬应该是“企业绩效对高管能力的敏感程度”和“企业能够提供的除报酬以外的利益”的函数,并且侧重分析了额外利益的影响;如果企业关于市场中高管能力评价的信息不一定是正确的,那么企业高管的报酬应该由“管理者的特征”、“企业绩效对高管能力的敏感程度”、“企业能够提供的除报酬以外的利益”共同决定的。
The remuneration of managers not only has the function of encouraging managers to work hard, but also should promote the equilibrium of managers’ market, that is, managers who can achieve high ability can get higher remuneration, otherwise, enterprises can not attract competent management Stay in this business. Based on this idea, we construct a simple model to examine the remuneration of managers after the equilibrium. Our conclusion is obtained under a fairly simplified condition that state-owned enterprises can obtain competent managers with less remuneration, but can not say that state-owned enterprises will certainly choose competent managers, that is to say , We can not say that managers of state-owned enterprises are more capable than private-owned enterprises. If the firm’s information about the evaluation of senior managers’ competence in the market is correct, then the compensation of senior executives should be “the sensitivity of firm performance to executive ability” and “the benefit other than compensation” that the firm can provide Function, and focuses on the analysis of the impact of additional benefits; If the enterprise information on the evaluation of the ability of executives in the market is not necessarily correct, then the compensation of executives should be “manager’s characteristics”, “high performance of enterprises The sensitivity of management ability ”, “ The enterprise can provide benefits other than compensation ”common decision.