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本文在Nash讨价还价模型的基础上,以企业要素所有者博弈入手,以资源和经济权力禀赋为视角,重新演绎了非对等资源禀赋和权力结构下的股权定价模型。指出,股权价值取决于股东的资源和权力禀赋结构。即股东资源价值越大,则控制权越大、剩余分配越多,该股东实际股权价值越高;股东间资源禀赋越不对等,控制权结构越不平衡,企业利益侵占越严重,弱势股东的实际股权价值越低;在现实经济中,股票并非天然体现“同股同权,同股同价”特性。
On the basis of the Nash bargaining model, starting with the game of enterprise factor owners, this paper re-deduces the equity pricing model under non-equivalent resource endowments and power structure from the perspective of resources and economic power endowments. Pointed out that the value of equity depends on the shareholders’ resources and power endowment structure. That is, the greater the shareholder’s resource value, the greater the control right and the more the remaining distribution, the higher the shareholder’s actual equity value; the less equal the resource endowment among the shareholders, the more imbalanced the control right structure, the more serious the corporate interests encroachment, The lower the actual value of the equity; in the real economy, the stock is not a natural manifestation of “same-class shares with the same rights, the same share price ” characteristics.