地缘关系是构成中国关系型社会的重要基石,本文把省级领导人在所管辖省份内曾经的重要任职经历地定义为拥有省级核心领导人主政关系的区域,并研究拥有这种主政关系的微观企业是否因核心政府官员情系故地而享受到地域偏爱。实证结果发现,省级核心官员对处于其重要任职经历所在地域的上市公司表现出明显的地域偏爱情结,表现为拥有主政关系的上市公司获得了更多的政府补助,且这一结果主要体现在有政治关联和最终控制人为国有的上市公司中;进一步研究发现,上述关系因官员主政关系的强度和地区腐败程度的不同而存在差异,且上市公司因主政关系而获取的政府补助并未显著提高经济效益,反而明显降低了社会效益;此外,还发现拥有省级领导人的老乡关系对公司获得政府补助没有显著影响。本文的结果表明地域偏爱是除了政治晋升激励之外核心政府官员干预微观经济的重要机理。结论为产业政策之争提供了进一步的证据,同时支持了全面深化体制改革中以制约主要领导干部权力为重点的政治体制改革,对官员任职的“地域回避”制度设计也提供了优化建议。 Geopolitical relations constitute an important cornerstone of China’s relationship-based society. In this paper, the important experience of provincial leaders once held in the provinces under their jurisdiction is defined as the area in which the leaders of the provincial-level leaders hold the political relationship, Whether the micro-enterprises of the relationship enjoy geographical preference because of the loyalty of core government officials. The empirical results show that provincial-level core officials show obvious regional preference for the listed companies in the region where they hold important positions of office experience. The result is that the listed companies that have the dominant relationship get more government grants, and the result is mainly reflected In a listed company with political connection and ultimate control of state ownership, further research finds that the above relationship is different due to the difference between the strength of officials’ official relations and the degree of regional corruption, and the government subsidies obtained by the listed companies due to the government are also But did not significantly improve the economic benefits, but significantly reduced social benefits; In addition, we found that the relationship between the fellow and the provincial leaders did not significantly affect the government’s grants. The results of this paper show that geographical preference is an important mechanism for core government officials to intervene in the micro-economy except political promotion and incentive. The conclusion provides further evidence for the dispute over industrial policies and at the same time supports the reform of the political system that focuses on restricting the power of major leading cadres in the process of system reform. It also provides suggestions on the design of the system of “regional avoidance” for the appointment of officials .