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本文尝试建立这样一个概念意义上的博弈模型,该模型试图从委托—代理理论出发,探讨政府规制是如何深入企业内部契约结构并与企业内部的委托代理契约相互作用的。在这个模型中,我们假设规制机构、被规制企业董事会和被规制企业经理人构成了一个双重委托代理关系,第一重委托代理关系存在于规制机构与被规制企业董事会之间,第二重委托代理关系存在于被规制企业董事会与经理人之间。另外,我们还给出了一个简要的有关规制或规制变革影响被规制企业股权结构、董事会特征、高管薪酬等三大公司治理特征的实证文献综述,以支持我们的理论模型。
This paper attempts to establish a game model in the conceptual sense. This model attempts to proceed from the principal-agent theory to explore how government regulation penetrates into the internal contract structure of an enterprise and interacts with the principal-agent contract within the enterprise. In this model, we assume that the regulatory agency, the regulated corporate board, and the regulated corporate managers constitute a dual principal-agent relationship. The first principal-agent relationship exists between the regulatory agencies and the regulated corporate boards. The second commission is The agency relationship exists between the regulated corporate board of directors and the manager. In addition, we also provide a brief empirical literature review of regulatory or regulatory changes affecting the regulated corporate ownership structure, board characteristics, and executive compensation, to support our theoretical model.